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lt is possible to think of choices in favour of meeting
basic rather than other needs which have been part of
debates within programmes of service or action.
Analysis of those choices is not a matter of listing a
favourite number of 'needs' (say five), measuring
them and then attempting to quantify some total (as,
for example, a total of 'housing deficits'). lt is seeing
what is involved in actual choices as they are
presented and as they work out.
lt is also that almost any choice or line of action
tends to continue to include some and exclude others:
one person's need for technological improvement is
another person's exclusion from customary employ-
ment. There are also problems in institutional action:
it is difficult to include and integrate existing and
particular concerns within an overall programme of
research, planning and administration. A slogan to
"Feed, Clothe, House" the nation (as in Guyana
after 1973) comes to mean (via import controls) an
assault on the customary, deeply entrenched and (in
that sense at least) basic diet of one community
rather than another. The provision of basic shelter
through self-help housing excludes those who cannot
meet conditions of residence, employment, stability
and physical inputs. This becomes part of the
explanation of the whole problem.
Let us look first of all at thc reality of such choices.
The question then is in part the meaning and appeal
of what is basic. We can examine two instances in
which this was faced. One example was the Third
Indian Public Service Pay Commission which made a
specific effort to calculate the minimum subsistence
needs of a peon as the base grade of the service, cost
the basket and structure the whole classification
system accordingly. The difliculty was, apparently,
that it would have put the base grade at too high a
level on which to build up the pyramid of
relativities and advancement which a public service is
supposed to require. Preparatory and post-colonial
services were already flattening these pyramids', as
the extreme racial distinctions and favouritism of
colonial administration were, to an extent, removed.
There had, it seemed, to be a limit, or so it was
argued.
A second example, a little older, is from the first visit
of a World Bank mission to Papua New Guinea in
I PauJ Rennell,The Historical LegacY of Coloitial Civil ServiceSalary
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1964. The then colonial (Liberal Country, viz.
conservative) Australian administration was ex-
plicitly in favour of what we might now recognise as
a basic needs strategy: "broadening the base by the
establishment of new schools"; viz, covering the
whole country with at least a minimum of formal
education. The Bank recommended the opposite
choice: "making the full course available in existing
schools"; a deliberately exclusive, or as its critics
said, elitist strategy2. The Bank called this its
"principle of concentration", which may be taken as
an appropriate label for the case against basic needs
To say, however, that such choices have sometimes
been 'real' is not the end of the matter. There are two
other features to be looked at. The first concerns the
ways in which a choice in favour of basic needs could
be conservative, with all that implies. That is to say, it
might well strengthen the forces keeping intact or
preserving a system as it is. Either 'concentration', as
in one case, or 'sustaining differentials', as in the
other, could be interpreted as instruments of change.
The opposite is, indeed, perhaps a reinforcement of
what is felt to be entrenched, customary, deeply
structured, profoundly held or possessed. An
expression of basic need, in so far as it implies a
'right' (that is an effectively recognised claim) is in
the strict sense of the word tending to the
ineluctable: a highly seventeenth century notion,
Lockeian, later Jeffersonian. I do not rehearse here
the degree to which that sort of perception has been
revolutionary or reactionary. The record is complex;
our interpretation is never disinterested.
Our first difficult task is then to work out the 'politics
of basic needs': in what sense is this dimension
conservative, in what sense radical? Furthermore in
what ways can the 'basic needs' dimension be
expressed in processes of rational calculation and
political choice; what types of outcome are such
processes likely to have? The dominant techniques to
aid rational calculation in policy choice are not
easily employed to express the case for the 'basic', the
'distributive', etc. Familiar factors have led to the
articulation of a case for considering distributive,
even basic needs as well as growth and that sort of
economic rationality in public policy decision-
making. The environmentalists tell us not simply to
assume that we should go ahead and exploit a mine:
think of other effects. lt is easy to assist the
2 t:eanotpiu t)ere/,in,ie,,; of (he 7 crotOre of Papuci New Guinet,, Johns
Hopkins and Oxford University Press, 965.
3 Compare the contemporarY discussion by Dennis Austin in Poldir.s
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progressive farmer; but should we not attempt to
channel aid directly to the rural poor, and so on.
However, the difficulty is then to recruit aids to
rational calculation which will provide quanti-
fications of these other welfare considerations which
are to be taken into account. Despite roots in welfare
economics, most of the available techniques, like cost
benefit analysis, perhaps inevitably express in-
dvidualistic rationalities.
Existing techniques of calculation also tend to
reinforce apparently attractive depoliticisations of
public policy decision-making4. In part they do so
because of the fundamentals of calculation. The
attempt to aggregate and add individual preference
functions obscures political relations, by presenting
them as objective and apparently non-conflicting.
Considerations like the 'will to pay' and the
inclusion of some (and therefore the exclusion of
other) participants have the same effect.
A restatement of the inevitability of politics in public
policy decision-making is needed. We need to
recognise the latent presence, and therefore the need
to make more manifest, the opposition of choices and
to encourage the mobjlisation of forces to assert the
interests of those who were in fact excluded in order
to counter the individualistic rationalisations and the
inescapably anti-welfare or anti-distributive premises
of such calculations. Leave to others defence of cost
benefit analysis; a correction of inescapable conflicts
over values, preferences, experience, calculation,
information and commitment in public policy
processes; reassessment of the role of aids to
calculation.
The force of any political recruitment, however, in
favour of the case for the basic and the excluded, (as
against hierarchy, differentials, the concentrated and
the 'progressive') might well be widespread precisely
to the degree to which it represents or voices what is
basic politics: has, that is to say, a necessary element
of the populist, as cost benefit analysis has of the
individualistic. To that extent, the populism of a
basic needs politics can reinforce the reactionary, as
indeed the populist, if freed from other types of
ideology, has always tended. In a choice between the
rational economics of individualistic progress and
the manic instincts of the populist politician, where
should one stand?
Another way of putting this is to ask what the
politics of basic needs actually demands and what it
may come to mean. This is related to the rival themes
behind claims: is the claim in fact a defence of some
things as they are, or on the contrary a demand for
4 For a fuller statement,P. J. O. Self, Econserafs and the Policy Process.
1975; Schaffer, 'On the Politics of Policy', ,4,&slralian Joar,,al of
Polities and History, 23, I April 1977, especially pp. 151-152
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crucial choices and distributive changes? A choice in
favour of basic needs, moreover, is supported only
with difficulty by the normal use of dominant aids to
rational calculation. Hence basic needs choices are
likely to depend on an evident politicisation (even a
re-politicisation) of public policy decision-making
processes. However if the case for basic needs (as in
Papua New Guinea: spread minimum education
inclusively) is to depend on a more political
expression (since cost benefit analysis cannot be
relied on), political mobilisation around a basic needs
programme might work out, as things have a habit of
doing, rather oddly.
The first point about the reality of a çhoice for basic
needs is the complexity of its political meaning.
There is a second: there is nothing especially new in
thinking about the problems of the minimum. The
history of ideas and policies leading to the Beveridge
welfare state is a case in point: the iron law of wages
and Poor Law reform; a harsh state minimum and a
charitable option; trade union difficulties about the
minimum and the differential; the persistence of
poverty at or below the minimum; the criticisms of
Illich. Classical political economy (Bentham,
Chadwick and Nassau Senior) demanded punitive
measures in relation to the persistent poor. So the
1834 Royal Commission on Poor Laws attempted to
abolish the outdoor relief of the Speenhamland
System altogether. Outdoor relief after all was held
to have corrupted the natural forces which would
abolish poverty through their effects on income level
and population. The burden of taxation for the Poor
Law was held to debase wages and investment, and it
created an alternative to the 'natural' minimum rate
of subsistence. So outdoor relief was actually the
cause of poverty; abolishing it would abolish poverty
'in the end'; in the interim a harsh and punitive poor
law (the workhouse) was absolutely necessary. In an
evangelical age its very harshness needed some
normative justification. The distinction between the
'deserving poor' who should be eligible for softer
measures of charity (something above the minimum
or basic) rather than harsh measures of state action,
and the 'undeserving poor' who therefore only
'deserved' what they got from the 1834 system (the
very basic minimum) suited this normative need
admirably
This position broke down through two main forces.
Booth and Tawney on through Bowley and Spring
Rice revealed the association of poverty with
permanent, recurrent, structural and inescapable
facts, like age, sickness, the conditions of working
class motherhood, sweated wages and long term
unemployment. These were either facts of economic
5 S. E. Finer, !.ifs' and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick, London.
Methuen, 1952; and Charles Dickens.
change and social inefficiency in housing and
sweated wages, or of personal and family life which
could not be dealt with, like the cost of sickness.
Minimal provision would not remove these causes,
even 'in the end'.
The second force was the extension of trade union
organisation beyond crafts and artisans to general
labour and women. This was associated with the
revolt against charity. The deserving poor did not
think much of what they got, and the undeserving
poor seemed to be the sick, the elderly and the
mothers. Neither the basic minimum nor the
charitable amelioration seemed quite right.
This change brought certain problems. In the first
place the impact and the political attitudes of working
class and trade union organisation on poverty itself
had not been consistent. High standards for some, a
maintenance of differentials and an equalisation
which neglected the lower percentiles had been the
order of the day. Contrast, for example, Tawney's
statements with Galbraith's sour words6. The point
once again is that extreme poverty--the 'lower
percentiles'--leads to isolation that is, it tends to
create dependence on hand-outs. The process of
delivering hand-outs 'individuates', isolates, alienates
the recipient, as political action and the social
relations of work tend on the contrary to create
solidarity. Once people have been isolated like this,
their isolation allows stereotyping to operate. We
then see in the history of ideas and of public policy a
variety of explanations which tend to justify things as
they are. Classical liberalism and charity provided
some; social science has provided others (problem
families and case work); political science and
political sociology offer further examples and
socialism others (the lumpen proletariat).
Furthermore, the actual measures both of classical
political economy and liberalism and welfare state
socialism seem to have had little effect on the
persistence of a poverty percentage: the submerged
10 per cent in developed societies. Compare the
percentage on poor relief in the l830s with those
dependent on the Supplementary Benefits Com-
mission in the l970s: both approach 10 per cent.
Poverty as a pattern of' distribution within
developing societies and as an international factor are
simply other examples of this persistence. Hence
alternative explanations have emerged, like Illich's
own implication that classical poverty would
disappear were it not for an artificial, 'modernised'
sense of deprivation (false deprivation as a sort of
false consciousness?)
6 R. I-4. Tawney, Tin' ,equisilii'e .Socieli'. London. Bet I. 92 LqunIile.
London. Allen and linwin, 93!; and J. K. (taibraith, Tin. 'I/f/,u'g
Sorie!v, Boston. Houghton. Muffin. 958.
This reveals the difficulties. There is an inherent,
almost inescapable tradition of thought which is in
favour of state action or private charity to ensure a
minimum, with optional individualistic choice for
anything above it. The institutionalisation and impact
of charity, and the problems of inclusion and
exclusion are rarely understood. Beveridge did
better: the minimum was to be statutory, not
charitable, hut essentially inclusive and non-
discretionary. Further, the minimum, basic, quasi-
inclusive was not, as it were, about the sectors in
which choices (e.g. for more than basic education)
could operate or perhaps be niet, but about some
(basic) as against other (non-basic) needs. The
conditions of access, like queuing for what was non-
urgent could, in so far as they were understood, be
accepted in that sense as an alternative to market
options.
Britain carne nearer to a satisfactory solution by the
inclusive nature of War damage?. The bombs fell
indiscriminately. Anyone might find himself with an
urgent need for immediate relief, even compensation.
All classes found themselves encountering public
administrative agencies distributing emergency
payments. Only the existing Assistance Board local
offices (ironically remnants of the Poor Law) had the
distributive network and the apparatus to manage
this. The encounter between the middle classes and
these agencies changed the classes, the administration
and social understanding: these classes demanded a
different style of treatment which only inclusiveness
of coverage and provision could have achieved.
Why can we not just say, then, that a new Beveridge
Report is the basic human needs strategy we are
looking for? Part of our answer in brief is, in fact,
that Beveridge and welfare state Fabianism, as
Herman Finer said, "assumed public administra-
tion". That is, it assumed that public administrative
agencies, the processes of organisation, were merely
neutral (or even benevolent) and at worst more or less
efficient instruments. A blunt knife might need
sharpening; it would not make you a vegetarian. This
is what we have come to question, especially about
Beveridge, hut also in all distributive programmes.
The actual rules and institut ions of t he distributive
processes arc highly problematic: they cannot just be
ignored or assumed away. The significance of their
effects, however, is especially heavy where the
programmes are supposed to he distributing basic
needs (e.g. low cost shelter, minimal food rations) to
those otherwise excluded (e.g. marginal rural-urban
migrant families). That is, the rules and institutions
are exceptionally ditilcult for them to handle (e.g.
with coiiditions of residence and documentation).
7 Riitard Titn,u.ss. !'ro/,ir,n.s of .S',n-io/ Po/ter, i950. passim.
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Hence, in basic needs programmes, it is above all
essential to consider these distributive problems: but
how is that to be done?
The most crucial problem is in fact the very exclusion
itself: not merely the exclusions of the dual mandate
or the dual society; the exclusion from growth; but
the exclusion from these developing services of the
formal and urban sector. Now the concept of
exclusion is open to discussion, in part because it is
the process of exclusion which makes benefits to the
included possible and desirable. Failure to consider
the relationship between exclusion and inclusion,
moreover, creates difficulties for the theory of
collective or public goods in which consumption is
supposed not to diminish supply so that there is no
need either for pricing or for conditions of access8.
The air to breathe is, indeed, a basic need. lt can be
free because the supply does not diminish as the
number of people breathing increases. It can be
freely available (without intervention of programmes
and agencies) for similar reasons. So goes the theory.
To state it is to explicate its inadequacy.
This makes the objective facts of exclusion more, not
less, open to criticism. We think of the need to
tackle the currently fashionable argument for 'saving'
the 'welfare state' by making inclusive services again
only minimal. Meanwhile the political dynamics of
integration in post-colonial states make the objective
exclusiveness of public programmes normatively,
and therefore from time to time actually, unaccept-
able. At least exclusiveness becomes a negative
evaluative criterion and a cause for action9.
If a basic needs strategy means anything it means
dealing with exclusion of areas, of people, of needs. Lt
is provoked not by lists and categories but by this
sort of record. Unfortunately this sets up certain
further inherent difficulties. The very facts of
exclusion from basic needs, the combinations of
peripheralisation of need, person and area with more
or less political voice, induces a resort to programme
and project. That is, where these potentially
'alienated', stereotyped, 'lower percentiles' do in fact
manage to exert a group claim, their very
maltreatment and exclusion from existing 'normal'
distribution (the housing market, e.g.) seems to imply
the creation of non-normal, unusual, specific
measures. Hence schemes for 'marginal farmers' and
'(landless) labourers'. This sets up a process of
institutionalisation which is in part a matter of
budgeting and of organisation building. This often
amounts to new institution-building, since it had
8 See the contemporary work by Fred Hirsch.
9 (3. 0. Wood, 'Rural Development in the Post Colonial State:
Administration and the Peasantry in the Rosi Region of North East
Biliar', Development and Change, 8, 3, 1977.
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been the failure, that is the evidently basic
exclusiveness of the existing institutions which
induced the new 'inclusive' basic programme, It also
sets up institutional rather than other types of
distribution and allocation, since again the existing
distributive processes (marketing especially) some-
how seem not to have worked. Rural services were
not being extended, inputs were not available.
On that track, instrumentation and itemisation take
over: rules of eligibility, priorities and definition of
the service item which is now to be extended in
response to the expression of exclusion from basic
need as far as the routines of institutional
distribution are concerned, and the detection of
failure or 'problem' (a different point) in policy
discussions. The actual methods of distribution, its
instrumentation, have to be devised: e.g. the
definition of the' papers, etc,, which will have to be
presented to demonstrate eligibility for the category
of person, need or area to be assisted; the setting up
of waiting lists and so on. And then, equally, the
definition and allocation of the actual item of service
itself: a temporary road job, a tower block top floor
fiat, a ration of rice inside an encampment. The item
of service eventually provided may be some distance
from basic needs and the background reality to the
claims of the excluded to these instruments and
service items.
This irony of institutional response to institutional
failure has aspects which we have shown elsewhere1 O
But the position of the people and areas excluded
from 'basic needs' and the instrumentation of
distribution itself are exactly the factors which
aggravated just those difficulties in the first place: of
handling bureaucracies; of physical access; of
timing; and of the dissonance of need and service
item.
We now see more clearly than ever that the
institutionalisation of distribution does not merely
fail to meet those scarcities and exclusions which
excite basic needs programmes in the first place. It is
actually the source of the situation itself in at least
two ways. One is the type of policy or problem
definition which institutional programme planners
are committed to. These are essentially problems of
addition, supply and overall deficit as distinct from
peripheral distribution and allocation.
The second point is that there are processes in
institutional distribution which themselves create
new exclusions and scarcities: bureaucratic costs;
iO Schaffer. Official Providers: Access, Equity and Participation'
Reporis/Studie EQU.i, Unesco Division for the Study of
Development, Paris.
limitations of official time; imposition of extrinsic
standards; allocation of public rights to some,
creating new costs and structures for others.
Furthermore, we also now see that this works its way
through hard as well as soft sectors. The evaluation
of highway and power projects has made this clear.
As Percy Selwyn's article in this issue shows, the use
of subsidies in public service has widespread costs
and only selective benefits. All contribute, only some
gain access. lt is the levels of cost working with the
processes of exclusion which create the difficulty.
These two points need some emphasis. Institutional
policy makers have to work to the sorts of problem
which they can handle, or, more strictly, which they
can manage but not quite solve (so that their 'basic
need', the maintenance of their role, is not
challenged). These tend to be aggregate concepts like
housing deficits, and technical and instrumental
solutions like construction programmes and point
allocation systems. The implication is that little
more, or less, can be done. The eye is turned away
from the initial need, and its domain of action.
Secondly, the allocative procedures themselves,
ironically enough, set up new costs, new exclusions,
new scarcities, new inequalities, new stratifications.
But that is not to say that a choice or concern for
basic needs is unreal. We have argued that it is real
but complex. In particular, a basic human needs
strategy means nothing unless it faces these problems
of distribution and allocation, of inclusion as against
exclusion, which excite the concern in the first place.
The formulation of such strategies, however, has to
involve non-Utopian solutions. Discussing the
possibilities would need another paper. It would
partly express a concern with the evidence of
institutional costs and of the institutionally excluded:
'degraded' exit and access, as Geoff Lamb and 1 have
called it elsewhere11, and would partly be an
explication of the inter-relation of basic service
provision with employment, income and locational
changes. Service provision of itself, especially in
basic needs, tends to failure, exclusion, misallocation
II SchalTer and G. B. Lamb, 'Exit. Voice and Access, Social Science
Infornzahion, XIII, 6. 1974.
and institutional dependency. There are also points
to be made about institutional processes themselves,
in administrative planning and evaluation, and, in
particular, in the possibilities of 'low-profile' low cost
alternatives to orthodox institution-building.
Some further implications would include the
comparison of fiscal with rationing measures and the
extension of the ideas of income guarantee and
minimum wage to new conditions. All, however,
fundamentally would have to do with the
improvement in the ability of the 'excluded' to handle
the institutional encounters whose exclusions,
impositions, costs and failures constitute so much of
their initial experience. A shorthand term for that
area is mobilised participation, but it is scarcely an
area for direct prescription here' 2 One prescriptive
question is whether that sort of dimension has any
implications for processes of institutional evaluation
and administrative planning themselves: the answer
is, I think, positive. In any case, political appeals
around basic needs and the demands made by choices
for basic needs on decision-making processes are
complex. The concern with ideas of a minimum is
long and complex too: Marx, Nassau Senior and
Beveridge are a mixed heritage. The Beveridge ideas
remain fertile, but the grounds of institutional action
then have to be traversed. The largest question is how
that is to be done.
12 SchalTer, 1977, p. 55; cf. S. P. Huntington and J. M. Nelson, No
EaSy Choice, Harvard, 1976.
Erratum
'Class Formation and Antediluvian Capital in
Bangladesh' (ieof Wood
In our last issue (Vol 9 no 3) p 40 I 12 should
read:
lt is another question whether these relations are
a temporaary phase of early accumulation
destined to transform the social formation into
mature capitalism (Chattopadhyay 1972); or
whether they are bound to persist and stunt the
development of capitalist relations in Bangladesh
(Patnaik 1972: Alavi 1975).
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